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GARY BECKER ON FREE BANKING
LUDWIG VAN DEN HAUWE3 
I. INTRODUCTION
THE RECENTLY EDITED Festschrift in honor of Pascal Salin41 
is a highly varied and disparate collection of contributions by 
colleagues, admirers and friends of the famous French professor 
of the Université Paris-Dauphine, ranging over a wide variety of 
subject matters, from personal testimonies and reflections about 
the methodology of the social sciences to contributions about the 
relationship between liberalism and Christianity and a plea on 
behalf of the liberalization of African economies, besides more 
conventional topics such as the economic analysis of taxation 
and the theory of money and banking. As such the book, which 
abundantly illustrates the wide-ranging intellectual interests and 
accomplishments of the French professor, constitutes a publi-
cation event of the greatest significance. It is probably hardly 
necessary to present the world-renowned professor even to a 
non-French public.52 In this contribution I will offer a few critical 
comments concerning one of the most remarkable contributions 
contained in the book, which is a paper by Nobel Prize winning 
economist Gary S. Becker entitled Free Banking (ibid., 227–234). 
It has been an apt initiative to include this paper into the 
Festschrift. As is well known among specialists, Pascal Salin´s role 
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in the diffusion of ideas related to currency competition and free 
banking has been seminal since years.3
In the new introduction to the paper written especially for 
the Festschrift in honor of Pascal Salin, Gary Becker points out 
that he wrote this paper on free banking in 1956 as a reaction 
to the 100-percent reserve proposals that were then popular, 
especially at the University of Chicago and that he intended to 
argue, basically, that a 100-percent reserve system requirement 
is an undesirable regulation since the banking industry was 
already overregulated. He also adds that the paper obviously 
needs a thorough rewriting, in particular to bring the treatment 
of macroeconomic policy up to date. 
The paper is a short one (8 pages) but it is nevertheless 
significant. It is interesting and important because it illustrates 
how far the views and theses of the Chicago School were originally 
removed from those of the Austrian School when it comes to the 
theoretical analysis of monetary and banking matters, and to some 
degree it also illustrates how considerably the debate and theses 
about free banking have evolved during the past fifty years. Both 
with respect to the definition of free banking, and with respect to the 
hypothesized working characteristics of this institution, Becker´s 
original paper made a number of claims which today appear 
quite remarkable from a more truly free banking perspective. In 
his new introduction to the original 1956 paper, Becker partially 
repudiates or mitigates his previous conclusions regarding free 
banking. This event offers a fitting opportunity to review some 
recent developments in the theory of free banking and to add a 
few clarifications about the present “state of the art” concerning an 
acceptable concept of free banking. 
II. GARY BECKER´S DEFINITION OF FREE BANKING
Becker´s original 1956 proposal for free banking contained the 
following ingredients:
3 See e.g., Salin (1990b). The Festschrift contains a full bibliography of Pascal 
Salin, see Laine M. and G. Hülsmann (eds.) (ibid.) pp. 17–43. 
The Festschrift also contains several other contributions about freedom 
in money and banking, see in particular Centi (2006), Gentier (2006) and 
Nataf (2006).
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1.  The Federal Government will retain its monopoly of the 
printing of currency or notes.
2.  Otherwise there will be essentially free banking. Banks 
will be free to set themselves up and establish their own 
reserve ratios, interest rates, lending policies, and so on. 
That is, banking will be considered an industry like any 
other, and competition rather than Government will be the 
controlling mechanism. 
3.  There will be some overall countercyclical policy. The leading 
idea is that the proper role of Government in combating 
cyclical movements is through overall, general policies and 
not through specific ones. 
Becker distinguishes his own proposal from two other kinds 
of schemes:
— The 100-percent reserve scheme as usually presented which 
provides for 100-percent reserves against deposits subject to 
check, and government monopoly of the note issue.
—  A kind of scheme which Becker characterizes as “the present 
intermediate position” and which he considers the least 
desirable of the three. 
In the remainder of the present paper I will take a critical 
look at the three ingredients which according to Becker´s original 
proposal define a free banking system. 
III. DOES FREE BANKING REQUIRE A GOVERNMENT 
MONOPOLY OF THE CURRENCY OR NOTE ISSUE?
In the new introduction to his 1956 paper written for the Fest-
schrift, Becker points out that he had originally been bothered by his 
conclusion that the Federal government should retain a monopoly 
over currency and that he had only reluctantly accepted the at that 
time common argument that the supply of notes would increase 
without bound if they were issued only by a competitive banking 
system. In view of what are now known as possible solutions of 
the durable goods problem—but which were not known 50 years 
ago—Becker now agrees that private bank money may be feasible. 
As regards the first ingredient of his scheme, Becker had 
originally provided the following rationale:
“Competitive private enterprise alone cannot provide this currency, for 
profit incentives would reduce this to a pure commodity standard. In 
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other words, the equilibrium price level would be infinity. This implies 
that a finite, relatively stable price level can be maintained only if the 
government issues notes.” (ibid., 229)
A footnote accompanying this passage refers to M. Friedman, 
without indicating any of Friedman´s writings more specifically. 
In his A Program for Monetary Stability (Friedman 1960), Milton 
Friedman had asked the question “whether monetary and banking 
arrangements cannot be left to the market, subject only to the 
general rules applying to all other economic activity (…)” (ibid., 
4) and he had listed a number of “good reasons” why monetary 
arrangements have seldom been left to the market. (ibid., 8) 
One of these “good reasons” relates to what Milton Friedman 
referred to as “the technical monopoly character of a pure fiduciary 
currency which makes essential the setting of some external limit 
on its amount (…).” (ibid. 8)
And in this respect he had indeed argued that:
“So long as the fiduciary currency has a market value greater than its cost 
of production—which under favorable conditions can be compressed 
close to the cost of the paper on which it is printed—any individual 
issuer has an incentive to issue additional amounts. A fiduciary currency 
would thus probably tend through increased issue to degenerate into 
a commodity currency—into a literal paper standard—there being no 
stable equilibrium price level short of that at which the money value of 
currency is no greater than that of the paper it contains. And in view of 
the negligible cost of adding zeros, it is not clear that there is any finite 
price level for which this is the case.” (ibid., 7)
As Becker points out in the introduction to the paper, the 
problems raised by the incentives of private banks to continue 
to issue money until prices measured in these currency units 
become infinite are related to the so-called “Coase conjecture” 
(Coase 1972), or the problem of pricing of durable goods over 
time by a monopolist.
As a monopolist continues to produce a durable over time, his 
past production competes against his current production. This raises 
the supply over time, and with a given demand function, forces 
down price over time. Eventually, prices reach the monopolist´s cost 
of production, and he no longer makes any profits.
As Becker pursues:
“There is an exact correspondence with money supply creation by a 
private bank. As the bank creates a new supply of money each period, 
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this flow competes against the supply created in prior periods, and the 
total stock rises over time—ignoring any physical depreciation in the 
stock. As the stock continues to rise, the value of this bank´s money falls 
until it reaches the cost of producing more of its money, which I take as 
approximately zero. Then prices in terms of this money are infinite, and 
the conclusion in the text follows.” (ibid., 228)
In Becker´s own scheme an infinite equilibrium price level 
would be avoided because checking institutions with demand 
liabilities would contract to convert deposits on demand into 
government notes (or currency). The possibility of conversion 
would induce banks to hold some of their assets in currency. The 
necessity of converting deposits into government notes leads to a 
finite nominal value of deposits, and hence to a finite price level. 
(230) 
Under imperfect foresight, which Becker indeed assumes 
(ibid., 229–230), the traditional approach to preventing a profit-
maximizing private issuer from hyperinflating is indeed to write 
a contract obligating the issuer to buy back his money at a pre-
determined price, i.e., a redemption contract. At least for money, 
redemption contracts would be cheap to write and enforce, or so it 
appears. (White 1999, 239) 
The technical monopoly character of a pure fiduciary currency 
to which Milton Friedman had made reference had been ques-
tioned in a much cited paper by Benjamin Klein. (Klein 1974) 
Klein´s theoretical case rested on the necessity for a producer of 
money to establish confidence in his money, and the increasing 
capital cost of creating such confidence. Several critics had raised 
doubts, however, about whether Klein´s argument can be carried 
over to a pure fi duciary currency. Historically, producers of money 
have established confidence by promising convertibility into 
some dominant money, typically specie. (see e.g., Friedman and 
Schwartz 1986 (1987))
In accordance with the so-called “Coase conjecture” (Coase 
1972) a contractual arrangement of the sort embodied in a 
redemption contract remains essential if a producer, who is selling 
a good above its marginal cost of physical production, wants to 
make it credible that he will not later drive the resale value down 
by selling more at a lower price. (also White 1999, 239) It does not 
yet follow, however, that a government monopoly on the note or 
currency issue is indeed necessary to ensure a finite equilibrium 
price level. Arguments of this sort predate not only the durable 
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goods literature but also the Public Choice revolution and the 
revival of the Austrian School including the Free Banking School; 
they also ignore the now extensive literature concerning the infla-
tionary bias and the effects of time inconsistency under a discre-
tionary central banking regime and concerning the dynamics of 
possible hyperinflation under central banking.4
A quarter of a century after Milton Friedman had considered 
the reasons for government involvement in monetary matters, 
he and Anna Schwartz reconsidered the same question in a 
paper entitled Has Government Any Role in Money? (Friedman and 
Schwartz 1986) and which clearly reflects the changed climate of 
opinion at that moment. According to Friedman and Schwartz the 
burst of renewed scholarly interest in various aspects of monetary 
reform was a response to several developments. In particular they 
mentioned the emergence of the theory of public choice and of 
the rational-expectations approach and the renewed interest in 
Austrian economics, with its emphasis on “invisible hand” inter-
pretations of the origin and development of economic institutions, 
and its interpretation of the business cycle as largely reflecting 
the effect of non-neutral money. (ibid., 499–500) As a significant 
external development they also mentioned the emergence of a 
world monetary system which they characterized as unprec-
edented: a system in which essentially every currency in the world 
is, directly or indirectly, on a pure fiat standard. (ibid., 500)
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz concluded in their 1986 
paper that “the possibility that private issuers can (…) provide 
competing, efficient, and safe fiduciary currencies with no role for 
governmental monetary authorities remains to be demonstrated 
(…)” (ibid., 520) but they also concurred, despite their critique of 
the proposal made by Benjamin Klein, that his argument “would 
not seem to preclude the simultaneous existence in the same 
community of several dominant moneys produced by different 
private issuers.” (ibid., 507)
The proposal made by the advocates of a system of fractional-
reserve free banking (see e.g., Selgin and White 1996] seems to 
comply with both desiderata, on the one hand the decentralized, 
competitive nature of the processes of the supply of inside money, 
4 White (1999) contains an excellent survey of these developments, except 
only for the theory of a 100-percent reserve requirement. The standard 
reference on the latter is now Huerta de Soto (2006a).
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and thus the total absence of any government role in the supply of 
inside money, and on the other hand the requirement of a possi-
bility of redemption in an outside (base) money, in accordance 
with Coase´s conjecture. 
It is important to realize, however, that fractional-reserve free 
banking by itself does not uniquely specify the base money regime. 
The money-supply implications of free banking are distinct from 
the implications of any particular monetary standard. (Selgin and 
White 1996, 19)
As Selgin and White explain:
“Base money could be gold or silver, as would be consistent with the 
evolution of a monetary system in which government had never 
intervened. Or it could be some fiat money, with the stock of fiat 
money permanently frozen (or otherwise determined by a strict rule) to 
eliminate any scope for discretionary monetary policy.” (ibid., 19)
Both Becker and fractional-reserve free bankers Selgin and 
White believe that given a particular base money regime and given a 
possibility of conversion or redemption of inside money into outside 
money in accordance with the Coase conjecture, the nominal value 
of the money stock and of the price level will be finite. 
Whereas Becker´s original argument was unambiguously in 
favor of a government monopoly of the supply of base money 
(currency or notes in Becker´s original proposal), fractional-
reserve free bankers Selgin and White seem to consider such a 
monopoly a possible and acceptable option among other options 
but apparently do not believe that a serious free banking proposal 
should be expected to take a definite stance on this issue. Therefore 
they go on:
“For this reason we do not discuss here the money-supply properties of 
any particular base money regime.” (ibid., 19)
The conclusion that the possibility (for market participants) 
and the obligation (for the banks) of converting or redeeming 
deposits in some base money—such as government notes or 
currency in Becker´s original proposal—would indeed contribute 
to ensuring a finite equilibrium price level can be granted. Whether 
this condition is also sufficient, however, would still depend upon 
the plausibility of the hypotheses we can formulate with respect 
to the conditions of supply (and with respect to the quantities 
supplied) of base money itself. Moreover base money brings in 
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problems of itself. Insecure linkage of ordinary money to reserve 
or base money has often impeded the smooth working of modern 
monetary systems. (Yeager 2001)
Therefore this author does not agree with the suggestion of 
Selgin and White that a serious free banking proposal can remain 
silent about this issue, and in particular concerning the properties 
and hypothesized working characteristics of different conceivable 
base money regimes. A consistent and serious free banking 
proposal should not simply assume that, given a central monetary 
authority supplying base money in the form of fiat money, the 
stock of fiat money is permanently frozen, or that it is determined 
by a strict rule, or that there is no scope for discretionary monetary 
policy, etc. The realism of any such assumptions is disputable on 
both historical and theoretical grounds.5
The considerations which raise serious doubts not only about 
Becker ´s original plea in favor of a government monopoly of 
the currency issue but also about Selgin´s and White´s agnostic 
attitude with respect to the desirable base money regime are at 
least threefold: 
(a) Public Choice considerations:
A central bank which is capable of influencing the amount 
of credit expansion effectuated by the monetary system will not 
be immune from the actions and initiatives of pressure groups 
lobbying for the benefits accompanying such credit expansion. 
The benefits to be derived from credit expansion may tend to be 
relatively more concentrated, that is, directed towards identifiable 
groups, than the costs of credit expansion which may be largely 
diffused among the general public. Public choice analysis, espe-
cially Olson´s, has revealed that it is easier to form an interest 
group when the number of potential members is small than when 
the number is large. (Olson 1971) A central bank may thus typically 
5 It is not even clear that we need a concept of “base money” or a conceptual 
distinction between “inside money” and “outside money.” 
The proposal for a system based on a 100-percent reserve requirement is 
not based on the distinction between inside money and outside money. It 
does involve, however, a different distinction, namely that between money 
and money titles.
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face incentives to pursue goals other than the low inflation desired 
by the public; monetary authorities may be led to pursue a political 
agenda, contrary to the interests of the average citizen, etc.
(b) The literature on Rules versus Discretion
In the wake of a number of contributions exploring the role 
of dynamic inconsistency (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and 
Gordon 1983a, 1983b) the debate on monetary policy and the 
appropriate role of central banks has for decades been dominated 
by discussions concerning the relative desirability of rules versus 
discretion as different possible approaches. With reference to 
monetary policy, the general idea is rather straightforward: a central 
bank seeking to manipulate the economy into the best combination 
of inflation and unemployment through discretionary policy, may 
find out that its options are so limited that discretion turns out to 
be a trap, when it faces a public that understands the game.
These models show that discretionary “optimal control” 
policy, with period-by-period decision making, can fail to attain 
the best attainable outcome even when there is no knowledge 
problem, and no malincentive problem. A sub-optimal outcome 
occurs, even if the monetary authority can perfectly predict the 
timing, and magnitude, of the effects of changes in money growth 
on the inflation and unemployment rates, and has a preference 
function identical to the public´s. The reason for the ill effect of 
discretionary policy, is that agents with rational expectations 
respond to prospective changes in monetary policy, revising their 
inflation-rate expectations accordingly. A change in the expected 
inflation rate alters the parameters of the policy-maker´s decision 
problem, and calls for further adjustments to policy. The sequence 
of such conjectural changes converges on a sub-optimal outcome. 
The outcome is sub-optimal because, in period-by-period decisions 
taking the discretionary regime and its associated rational expec-
tations as given, the policy-maker cannot internalize the effect that 
the policy regime itself has on expectations, and, thereby, on the 
decisions of agents. Discretion results in sub-optimality because 
there is, in the nature of the case, no way to induce future policy-
makers to consider the effect of their likely discretionary policy, via 
expectations, on the decisions of current agents; and there is no way 
to convince perceptive agents, today, that if they were to expect a 
long-run optimal policy (zero inflation) to prevail tomorrow, they 
will not be cheated when tomorrow arrives, by the choice of what 
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then seems the best policy (positive inflation). Some sort of rules or 
binding precommitments are needed to internalize the externality 
from unconstrained future policy. (see also White 1999, Chapter 
10) 
The analysis of time inconsistency in monetary policy has been 
important for at least two reasons. First, it forces us to examine the 
actual incentives faced by the central bank. The time-inconsistency 
literature contrasts sharply with the older tradition in monetary 
policy in which the policy-maker was simply assumed to follow 
an arbitrary or perhaps optimal rule. The newer view stresses that 
policy-makers may face incentives to deviate from such rules. 
Probably the most important contribution of the literature on time 
inconsistency has thus been to provide a theoretical framework for 
thinking formally about credibility issues, on the one hand, and 
about the role of institutions and political factors, on the other, in 
influencing policy choices. 
Second, to the extent dynamic inconsistency is important, 
models that help us to understand the incentives faced by policy-
makers and the nature of the decision problems they face are 
important for the normative task of designing policy-making 
institutions. In order to influence efforts at reform and redesign of 
society´s monetary institutions, monetary economists need models 
that help in understanding how institutional structures actually 
affect policy outcomes. From the perspective adopted here it will 
be noted that the proposals for reform of our monetary insti-
tutions which have resulted from this literature have nevertheless 
remained extremely limited.6
It is the great merit of Pascal Salin to have had the courage 
to push the analysis beyond the conventional boundaries. In an 
important critical note concerning Bennett T. McCallum (1988) 
and Alan S. Blinder (1988) Pascal Salin has pointed out that the 
usual ranking, even if it involves some useful distinctions such 
as the differences between simple rules and complex rules and 
the differences between rules concerning instruments and rules 
6 One kind of proposal that has been made is to delegate monetary policy to 
an independent central banker who is conservative in the sense of placing 
a higher relative weight on inflation stabilization than does society as a 
whole. Another type of proposal consists in contriving an optimal incentive 
contract for a central banker who responds to monetary incentives. See M. 
Obstfeld and K. Rogoff (2002) and the literature cited there.
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concerning outcomes, is actually a partial ordering of a wider class 
of possibilities. In particular the more fundamental distinction is 
the distinction between rules of just conduct and commands, i.e., 
rules commanding a result. Adding this distinction between rules 
of just conduct and rules imposing a result, the classification ought 
to be the following:
1. Rules of just conduct
2. Rules of result (specific commands)
 2A. simple rules
  a. instrument-based rules
  b. outcome-based rules
 2B. complex rules (close to 3—discretion)
3. Discretion
Policies have to be evaluated according to (1) the extent to 
which they are respectful of property rights and (2) their capacity 
to give reliable information. Considering first-best solutions a 
feasible option, a rule of just conduct in the field of macroeconomic 
policy would then imply, for instance, a practicable variant of 
currency competition. Considering, however, that we live in a 
second-best world where the production of money is monopolized 
by the State, rules are better than discretion, and instrument-based 
rules are preferable to outcome-based rules. (see Salin 1988a) 
(c) The Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle:
Gary Becker does not mention the Austrian theory of the business 
cycle and perhaps he has reasons, which are left implicit, to reject it 
or not to consider it a valid account of cyclical movements in the 
economy. A possible different explanation of the lack of any reference 
by Becker to Austrian economics probably resides in the fact that his 
original article predates the revival of Austrian economics by almost 
twenty years. Nevertheless the Austrian theory of the business cycle 
contains a more or less explicit argument against money and credit 
creation by a central bank, and this argument, since it is conceived 
from within a peculiar scientific framework, is distinct from the two 
previous arguments. 
There are reasons to believe that central-bank monetary policy, 
even under a non-discretionary rules-based regime, will yield 
sub-optimal outcomes. These reasons can be grasped from the 
perspective of an altogether different theoretical framework.
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Under central banking, the banking system demands money 
issued by the central bank—known as “base money”—to meet the 
demand for currency in circulation, to clear interbank balances and 
to meet the requirements for the minimum reserves that have to 
be deposited with the central bank. Given its monopoly over the 
creation of base money, the central bank is in a position to exert a 
dominant influence on money market conditions and thereby steer 
money market interest rates. Changes in money market rates in 
turn affect other market interest rates, albeit to varying degrees. 
This mechanism of tampering with money market conditions 
and in particular with interest rates inevitably sets the stage for 
the processes of forced saving, the boom-bust cycle and recurring 
recessions. This observation remains valid even if the central bank 
adopts as its primary objective the maintenance of price stability. 
In line with the way inflation actually operates in contem-
porary central banking systems, it can at first be assumed that 
an additional supply of money is created by a deliberate policy 
move by the monetary authority, for instance by an injection of 
bank reserves through an open market purchase. If additions 
to the money supply are made through open market operations, 
new reserves arrive at those banks who sell securities. As a result 
these banks now have additional reserves to lend out, and these 
additional reserves will cause banks to lower the rates of interest 
they are charging in order to attract additional borrowers for those 
additional reserves, increasing the level of investment. At the 
lower market rate, investors will be more interested in borrowing 
and longer-term investment projects in particular will be more 
attractive at the new rate. However, because the time-preferences 
of consumers have not changed, there is no reason to expect that 
ex ante savings will have changed. The additional borrowing that is 
taking place is not being financed by the voluntary savings of the 
public. Inflation thus creates an intertemporal discoordination, that 
is to say a mismatch between the time-preferences of the public and 
the cost of funds faced by investors. Ex ante investment is greater 
than ex ante savings but since ex post investment must equal ex post 
savings, the total amount of ex post savings is greater than what 
the public voluntarily wishes to save. The difference is referred 
to as forced savings. It is important to realize that even though 
forced savings provide the resources necessary to undertake the 
inflation-driven investments, they cannot render the ensuing 
capital structure sustainable because the savings are not reflective 
of the actual time-preferences of the actors from whom the savings 
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have been involuntarily extracted. The ways in which the recipients 
of the excess supplies of money decide to dispose of their excess 
real balances will begin a process of relative price disruption. Such 
injection effects will also matter for the intertemporal price structure. 
Credit expansion—or the lending of money into existence—sets 
into motion a process of capital restructuring which is at odds with 
the unchanged intertemporal preferences of economic agents and 
which is therefore ultimately ill-fated. Because of the mismatch 
between intertemporal production decisions and preferred 
intertemporal consumption patterns, the boom will be revealed 
as unsustainable. The changes in the intertemporal structure of 
production are self-defeating. Resource scarcities and a continuing 
high demand for current consumption eventually turn boom into 
bust. Therefore a centralized banking system can be expected to 
generate a higher degree of intertemporal discoordination and 
macroeconomic instability—and therefore also a higher rate of 
accompanying waste—than a decentralized banking system, in 
particular a banking system operating on the basis of a 100-percent 
reserve requirement.
Higher degrees of intertemporal discoordination and macro-
economic instability beget higher rates of waste. In the process of 
lengthening and then shortening of the structure of production, 
as occurs in the course of a Hayekian cycle, what could have been 
produced to satisfy human needs, had the malinvestments not 
taken place, and had the monetary expansion not discoordinated 
the interdependent plans of market participants, is lost forever. 
Errors cannot be corrected costlessly.
Is this theory still relevant for the understanding of real-world 
events? Today´s economists generally accept that the factors 
underlying business cycles have a variety of origins, of both a 
demand- and a supply-related nature, but they also increasingly 
recognize that these may well include Austrian aspects. It may be 
that Austrian factors have become more important with the changes 
in the international financial system of the past twenty years. 
Increasingly mobile capital flows now quickly seek out investment 
projects that are perceived to provide the most attractive returns. 
The Japanese boom and bust of the 1980s and 1990s is an example 
of a recent cycle with Austrian characteristics. The upturn of this 
cycle was driven by strong expansions of money and credit, which 
fueled a level and direction of investment that was unsustainable. 
In the aftermath, businesses suffered from chronic overcapacity, 
and long-term declines in corporate profitability led to a sharp 
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deterioration of banks´ loan portfolios. Moreover, the traditional 
Keynesian policy approach of demand stimulation was unsuc-
cessful in bringing the economy out of recession. In fact repeated 
injections of liquidity by the Bank of Japan have worked to delay 
the necessary restructuring effort. (also Oppers 2002) 
The previous considerations elucidate some of the reasons 
why some authors have considered that the theorists of the 
Chicago School are guilty of naiveté in ascribing to governments 
the desire and ability to administer a stable monetary policy 
under all circumstances. (e.g., Huerta de Soto 2006, 735) This 
naiveté was also apparent in Becker´s original 1956 paper in 
which he arrived at the conclusion that a government monopoly 
of the currency issue is preferable to decentralization in banking 
and currency competition. In fact, the foregoing considerations 
entitle us to reject not only Becker´s original proposal for a 
government monopoly of the currency issue but also Selgin´s 
and White´s agnostic attitude with respect to the desirable base 
money regime, and to adopt instead a presumption in favor of 
(1) decentralization in banking and thus the elimination of a 
centralized monetary authority such as a central bank and (2) 
a monetary standard or base money regime based on specie, in 
particular a gold standard. As Ludwig von Mises used to point 
out, the decisive advantage of a commodity standard—such as 
a gold standard—is that it makes the increase in the supply of 
the commodity depend upon the profitability of producing it. 
(e.g., Mises 1998, 471) 
Moreover Ludwig von Mises´s views about free banking were 
still closer to certain classical definitions of freedom in banking, 
as they were stated in the nineteenth century, in particular in 
the writings of authors like Charles Coquelin and Henri Charles 
Carey. These classical views are well synthesized in a separate 
contribution to the Festschrift authored by Antoine Gentier. (ibid., 
251–264) According to these conceptions, the idea of a government 
monopoly of the printing of currency or notes is considered 
contrary to the very essence of a genuine free banking system. 
IV. IS FRACTIONAL-RESERVE BANKING TO BE CONSIDERED AN 
INDUSTRY LIKE ANY OTHER? 
The proposition that banking in general is to be considered an 
industry like any other can be acknowledged as accurate provided 
it is correctly interpreted, that is, if it is understood in the following 
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sense: There are no reasons not to subject the business of banking 
to the same general rules of conduct as those to which other kinds 
of business are subject. The question then remains what exactly 
those rules are. Finding a generally acceptable answer to this 
latter question constitutes the real source of controversy in this 
domain. Becker´s rejection of the 100-percent reserve schemes is 
based on his belief that the 100-percent reserve rule constitutes 
an instance of “overregulation” or an “undesirable regulation” 
of the banking industry. This rejection clearly places him outside 
of the mainstream in monetary and banking matters within the 
Chicago School. The Old Chicago-School tradition of support for 
a 100-percent reserve requirement can be associated with names 
of theorists such as Henry C. Simons, Albert G. Hart and James W. 
Angell, among others. Irving Fisher compiled these proposals in 
book form in his 100 Percent Money.7 The trend finally culminated 
in the publication of Milton Friedman´s already mentioned A 
Program for Monetary Stability in 1959. The 100-percent fiat standard 
as proposed by Irving Fisher and continued by the Chicago School 
must be distinguished from the proposals of the hard money 
school, however. Both schools differ in emphasis and fundamental 
philosophy. The Chicago School views the 100-percent money 
proposal as a “technique,” that is to say an efficient, useful tool of 
the government in controlling the money supply and eliminating 
the inherent instability of fractional-reserve banking, due to lags 
or friction in the banking system. The return to 100- percent specie 
in contrast is regarded as a return to the free market in money 
and the full restoration of property rights for depositors. It will 
further be noted that business cycle effects can be generated by the 
100-percent fiat reserve standard as well as by a fractional-reserve 
banking system. Jesús Huerta de Soto summarized his assessment 
of the Chicago School proposals very well when he wrote:
“However, in general, Chicago theorists have defended a 100-percent 
reserve banking system for exclusively practical reasons, believing this 
requirement would make government monetary policy easier and more 
predictable. Therefore the theorists of the Chicago School have been 
guilty of naiveté in ascribing to governments the desire and ability to 
administer a stable monetary policy under all circumstances.” (2006, 
734–735) 
7 For the Fisher proposal see I. Fisher ([1935] 1997); on the Chicago plan 
see, among others, Angell (1935), Hart (1935), Graham (1936), Simons 
(1936). See also the survey in Huerta de Soto (2006), 731–35. 
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Becker believes that his proposal, when compared with 
the Friedman-style 100-percent scheme, is superior in at least 
two respects. First, whereas the 100-percent reserve scheme is 
thought to take government intervention out of the industry 
of lending and borrowing, his scheme goes further in that it 
also takes government intervention out of the checking deposit 
industry. Therefore, on the grounds of minimizing direct 
government control his proposal is thought to be desirable. 
(ibid., 233) Second, whereas the 100-percent scheme means 
that there will be freely determined reserve ratios for all 
private obligations other than checking deposit liabilities, his 
own scheme does not treat checking deposits differently from 
other short run assets and thus makes no artificial distinction 
between checking deposits and other short run assets. His 
own scheme says that there will be freely determined reserve 
ratios for all private liabilities. There will nevertheless be 
100-percent reserves against notes, the issue of which would be 
a government monopoly. (ibid., 233–234) 
Both alleged virtues of Becker´s scheme are illusory, however. 
Becker´s first point is question-begging since it assumes what 
has to be rendered plausible in the first place, namely that the act 
of creating checking deposits out of nothing—which constitutes 
the normal activity of the checking deposit industry but which 
at the same time is a modality of money creation—constitutes 
an act of normal business essentially similar to any other kind 
of honest business, that is, acts of the same order as, say, selling 
a product or a service. As Austrian theorists have pointed out 
repeatedly and consistently, there are important reasons for not 
considering the act of creating money ex nihilo as an act of the 
same order as, say, selling a product or any other kind of normal 
and honest business acts. But then, and so long as (some degree 
of) government intervention in the domain of law enforcement 
is taken for granted, that is, so long as law enforcement has not 
been completely privatized, a (second-best) case can be made 
for government intervention in the checking deposit industry, 
in particular by imposing a 100-percent reserve requirement, 
be it only as an imperfect and temporary solution. The concept 
of “regulation” and therefore also those of “de-regulation” and 
“over-regulation” undeniably exhibit a certain ambiguity. In a 
world characterized by an almost universal (but disputable) 
recognition of the legitimacy of fractional-reserve banking, 
imposing a 100-percent reserve requirement in banking may 
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at first seem to constitute a step towards more regulation and 
thus appear as a move away from the principles underlying the 
functioning of a free, unhampered market society.8 Advocates of 
such a 100-percent reserve requirement will point out, however, 
that this cannot be true, for by and large the same reasons that, 
say, a state-enacted law forbidding certain forms of theft and 
fraud could not possibly constitute a move away from the legal 
and/or ethical principles of a free market society. If imposing a 
100-percent reserve requirement may indeed appear as a form 
of “regulation,” then it is a form of regulation which actually 
restores to operation a free market principle, even if on the 
other hand the concept of “regulation,” in most of its ordinary 
uses, has usually the opposite connotation of a move away 
from the free market, and actually, of a violation of free market 
principles. 
As regards the second point, it is not correct to stipulate that the 
distinction between checking deposits on the one hand and short 
run assets on the other is an artificial one, or that it is not really 
important. The act of creating checking deposits out of nothing for 
a certain amount is an act of money creation for the same amount. 
Checking deposits, being redeemable into base money at par and 
upon demand, constitute readily available purchasing power for 
the market participants who hold these deposits. In this respect 
their status is similar to that of actual depositors, that is, market 
participants who actually made a shift from holding money in the 
form of currency to holding money in the form of checking deposits, 
thus modifying only the form in which they dispose of money, and 
without ever giving up any readily available purchasing power 
in the process of performing this shift. On the other hand such a 
shift between currency and checking deposits—and in particular 
a shift from currency to deposits—is of course different from the 
act of creating the checking deposits out of nothing since in and 
by itself a shift from currency to deposits subject to check is not 
directly an act of money creation. In a different sense such a shift 
is no less different, however, from the act of creating a short run 
8 Apparently this was also Pascal Salin´s view; see his 1990b, p. 150. Pascal 
Salin writes regarding M.N. Rothbard´s 100-percent reserve proposal : 
“Certains auteurs—tels Murray Rothbard (par exemple dans The Mystery 
of Banking (…))—qui sont de vigoureux adversaries de l´intervention 
étatique se rallient pourtant à cette proposition. ”
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liability or of acquiring a short term asset. A market participant 
who grants a loan to a bank and who acquires a short term asset 
in exchange at least temporarily gives up an amount of readily 
available purchasing power. We can thus see that Becker´s proposal 
for a regime of banking with fractional reserves, no less than all 
other proposals for fractional-reserve banking, has to involve an 
attempt to obliterate the unbridgeable conceptual gulf between 
deposit arrangements and loan arrangements. Since a fundamental 
distinction between loan arrangements and deposit arrangements 
has traditionally been sanctioned and vindicated by general legal 
principles, the case for fractional-reserve banking is particularly 
uneasy from the legal-theoretical perspective.9
V. IS THERE ANY NEED FOR SOME OVERALL 
COUNTERCYCLICAL POLICY UNDER FREE BANKING?
Under Becker´s proposal for free banking a shift between 
currency and checking deposits—and even if one is free to consider 
that such a shift does not in and by itself constitute a change in 
the money supply—may have an (indirect) effect on the stock of 
money, and thus also on economic activity.
The point is clearly acknowledged by Becker himself since 
he writes:
“For example, shifting from time deposits or from the granting of book 
credit affects the firms with these short run liabilities. Their cash reserves 
will generally only be a small fraction of their total short run liabilities. 
If their creditors demand cash the reserves will be run down, and to 
some extent this probably will force them to contract their lending (or 
spending as the case may be). Consequently there will be depressive 
effects on income and employment.” (ibid., 231)
Becker´s proposed system would thus not be free from what 
one author has recently characterized as “the perils of base money.” 
(Yeager 2001) As Yeager reminds, inflations and deflations and the 
attendant disruptions of economic calculation and coordination 
have been mainly phenomena of base money and its manner of 
injection and withdrawal. (ibid., 260)
Becker also considers the possibility of introducing a system 
of government insurance of bank deposits so that banking panics 
9 The definitive treatment of these legal-theoretic issues is now to be found 
in Huerta de Soto (2006a); see in particular Chapters 1 and Chapter 3.
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such as the one that occurred during the Great Depression would 
be prevented but he rejects such a proposal as undesirable because 
of “the desire to get the government out of the banking business.” 
(ibid., 232) In conjunction with his rejection of government-backed 
deposit insurance schemes, Becker conjectures that “[a]n effective 
general countercyclical policy would probably be sufficient to 
prevent any large scale panic.” (ibid. 233) It is thus supposed that 
general countercyclical activity of the government will succeed in 
keeping within tolerable limits both bank failures due to panicky 
attempts to convert deposits into currency and failures of other 
kinds of firms.
How should Becker´s rejection of government deposit 
insurance be evaluated? Both at the theoretical level (Diamond 
and Dybvig 1983) and from a historical perspective the force of the 
argument in favor of government deposit insurance should not be 
underestimated. As Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 11) remind us, 
writing about the Great Contraction:
“In banking, the major change was the enactment of federal deposit 
insurance in 1934. This probably has succeeded, where the Federal 
Reserve Act failed, in rendering it impossible for a loss of public 
confidence in some banks to produce a widespread banking panic 
involving severe downward pressure on the stock of money; if so, it is 
of the greatest importance for the subsequent monetary history of the 
United States. Since the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, bank failures have become a rarity.” 
And further:
“Adopted as a result of the widespread losses imposed by bank failures 
in the early 1930´s, federal deposit insurance, to 1960 at least, has 
succeeded in achieving what had been a major objective of banking 
reform for at least a century, namely, the prevention of banking panics.” 
(ibid., 440) 
Following this account Becker´s rejection of government 
deposit insurance and his endorsement of countercyclical policy 
instead seem questionable indeed. It will be noted, however, that 
the institution of a deposits insurance system entails problems of 
moral hazard (regulation failure). A bank´s depositors are guar-
anteed against loss, and therefore lose any incentive to monitor the 
management of the banks with which they keep their funds. The 
management need no longer worry about maintaining depositor 
confidence, and so they take more risks, run down the bank´s 
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capital, and generally undermine the bank´s financial health. 
(Dowd 1996, 454–5)10
From this perspective Becker´s rejection of government 
deposit insurance constitutes clear proof of prescience since he 
writes that “[i]f government insured they would necessarily 
influence reserve ratios, lending activity, etc.” (ibid., 232) It will 
be noted, however, that the institution of a lender of last resort has 
similar effects. A bank´s management can rely on the central bank 
to provide it with emergency loans, that is, loans it presumably 
could not obtain elsewhere in the market, or could only obtain 
at greater cost. The availability of such loans reduces the penalty 
to the bank for allowing its credit-worthiness to deteriorate, and 
thereby implicitly encourages the bank to act in ways that promote 
such deterioration. (Dowd 1996, 454–5)
The economic rationale for countercyclical policy offered by 
Becker invites some further comment. This rationale is framed as 
an argument in terms of the necessity or at least the desirability of 
curing (correcting) external effects:
“It is argued that when an individual shifts between currency and 
checking deposits he merely wishes to alter the form in which his 
“money” is held. But because of fractional reserve banking this shift 
affects the total stock of money, and hence prices and employment. Since 
the latter changes affect other individuals, there is an argument based 
on the discrepancy between social and private costs for government 
control of the effects of this shift. (…) More generally, any shift from 
goods or debt into currency imposes through the multiplier or velocity 
mechanisms social costs that are not completely borne by those doing 
10 The banking crisis in the USA during the 1980s demonstrated the conflict 
of interest that arose between commercial banks and regulators. The 
FDIC—the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—used to offer almost 
a de facto full insurance whose premium was not priced according to the 
risk exposure of the banking institution but as a percentage of deposits 
(these rules have been changed in 1991). Under that scheme a commercial 
bank on the edge of bankruptcy had an incentive to take even more risk 
given that the losses would fall on the insurance system and the benefits 
on the stockholders. Given that conflict of interest and the cost associated 
in terms of expensive bailouts, capital requirement has been considered as 
a solution to screen bank risk exposure. Bank capital adequacy regulation 
entails problems of its own, however, and thus offers no adequate solution 
either.
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the shifting. This, indeed, is the major argument for active government 
participation in fighting cyclical movements.” (ibid., 232)
Arguments for government intervention allegedly intended to 
cure the harm resulting from external effects had been made in this 
context before Becker. Vera Smith, in her rightly acclaimed book The 
Rationale of Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative, mentions 
the case of general runs on the banks as one where uncompensated 
damage is inflicted by the guilty banks on their innocent rivals, and 
as such giving grounds for some kind of intervention along the lines 
suggested by Pigou in his Economics of Welfare. (Smith 1990, 187)11 
Apparently for Vera Smith too 100- percent reserve banking is no 
alternative to be taken seriously since she writes that “no bank can 
be 100 percent liquid.” (ibid., 187)
Nevertheless the argument cannot be followed. We would 
today rather look for a solution in the direction of a more adequate 
definition and/or a more strict enforcement of property rights, that 
is, a re-definition and/or a stricter enforcement of the fundamental 
“rules of the game” rather than for a solution along Pigovian lines. 
Recent debates have in fact been framed in such terms. For instance 
the controversy between the fractional-reserve free bankers on the 
one hand and the advocates of a 100-percent reserve requirement 
in banking on the other is at bottom one pertaining to what 
constitutes an adequate definition and enforcement of property 
rights in banking.  
Any decision taken by any individual has consequences on 
some other individuals, which means that all the members of 
society are interdependent. But the fact that activities are inter-
dependent does not mean that there are externalities. One cannot 
assume that externalities exist without having first determined 
who has the right to do what. (Salin 1988b, 294) If property rights 
11 The British economist Arthur C. Pigou first developed the basis for the 
concept of a Pigovian tax (or subsidy); see his (1920). Pigou explained that 
in case the marginal social net product (including externalities) is different 
from the marginal private net product (net products are the results in 
the output of marginal resource increases), a tax or bounty (subsidy), 
depending on the sign of the difference, can be implemented to minimize 
the difference. There is only one tax or bounty for each externality that can 
lead to the optimum effect, that is, the equalization of the marginal private 
and social net product.
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are clearly defined, which means that one does know what each 
individual has the right to do and not to do, externalities do not 
exist. (ibid., 292) As Pascal Salin points out, the existence of exter-
nalities is mainly called for by people who would like others to 
behave as they wish. The word “externalities” is misleading, and 
we ought to speak rather of the absence of property rights and of 
legitimizing coercion. (ibid., 292)
But even if it were somehow possible to refer meaningfully to 
the existence of “externalities, it does not follow that governments 
are able to pursue a stabilization policy. Lacking the information 
on the working of the system, the preferences and targets of indi-
viduals, governments can take decisions only on the basis of a very 
simplified model of society. 
As Pascal Salin argues, besides the fact that the subject of 
macro-stabilization leads straight to the ethical problem of the 
desired frontier between the private sphere and the public sphere, 
there is no economic justification for macroeconomic stabili-
zation policy, and there can be no “public good” argument for 
state macroeconomic stabilization. Macroeconomic stabilization 
problems are mainly information problems, but information is not 
a public good and it is always costly. Information is best provided 
by those who have an interest in providing it. If the concept of 
macroeconomic stabilization has any meaning, it is best achieved 
in an environment of a decentralized decision-making process. 
The argument against macroeconomic stabilization is parallel to 
the one against central planning, which has been emphasized by 
the Austrian tradition. (Salin 1990a)12
The working of a free society implies or presupposes the defi-
nition of “general rules of conduct” which can partly be defined 
and sanctioned by an institution called “the state.” In his critique 
of the idea of macro-stabilization policies from a market process 
perspective Pascal Salin (1990a) concluded that individual stabili-
zation and, therefore, macro-stabilization are made easier if these 
rules are stable and predictable. Therefore, the contribution of the 
state to macro-stabilization ought to be stabilization of the rules, 
the definition of which is its specific responsibility.” (ibid., 220)
The even more consequential argument against general coun-
tercyclical policy contrived to counteract cyclical movements of 
12 This subject is also treated in a contribution to the Festschrift by Jesús 
Huerta de Soto (2006b), pp. 330–40.
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key economic variables, however, is that it can only add to the very 
evils it is supposed to cure. According to the Austrian theory of the 
business cycle which I have summarized, these cyclical movements 
and boom-bust cycles are themselves the inevitable consequences 
of money and credit expansion brought about by a centralized 
banking system operating under a regime of fractional reserves. 
The economic instability that is so characteristic of the actually 
existing capitalist economies is no “act of God.” The “generally 
bad times” to which Becker refers (ibid., 233) are not like “bad 
weather” due to the operation of uncontrollable natural forces, nor 
would such instability bedevil a truly unhampered market system 
free of government intervention in monetary and banking matters. 
The restoration of a 100-percent reserve rule in banking, far from 
being a specific kind of unwarranted government intervention in 
the market as Becker suggests, would only subject the banking 
business to the general rules of conduct appropriate for a free 
society.   
Nevertheless, past debates and discussions on how to 
conceive of adequate monetary arrangements from a market 
process perspective lead to the conclusion that some controversy 
(disagreement) in this domain is likely to subsist. Several scholars 
who have thought deeply about this question, including Pascal 
Salin, have favored a proposal for a free banking system based 
on fractional reserves. As this author has explained elsewhere 
(see van den Hauwe 2006) a different and arguably more effective 
way to achieve the result of monetary arrangements that would 
favor a desirable degree of macroeconomic stability would 
consist in bringing about a complete institutional separation of 
deposit banking from loan banking along the lines proposed by 
the advocates of a 100-percent reserve requirement in banking. 
Probably to some extent market forces could be relied upon in 
order to bring about this result.
Contrary to the allegation of Vera Smith a bank can indeed be 
100 percent liquid, in the sense that it can hold reserves against 
the total amount of its demand liabilities, i.e., the outstanding 
liabilities that are redeemable upon demand. 
The 100-percent reserves proposal is criticized in Yeager (2001). 
Yeager criticizes first the idea that money is essentially a commodity 
valuable in itself. Subsequently he also points to the impracticality 
of 100-percent reserves. He writes:
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“Money evolved from directly useful commodities that proved 
convenient as intermediaries in indirect barter (Menger 1871/1950, 
chapter VIII and Appendix J, Menger 1892, Menger 1892/1909/1970). 
To suppose, however, that the essence of a developed institution must 
remain specified by its genesis or earlies form is to commit the “genetic 
fallacy” (…). An example is to suppose, on historical grounds, that 
money is fundamentally or most properly a commodity valuable in 
itself, like gold or silver, and that if paper notes and bank deposits have 
taken over its functions, these substitutes should at least be redeemable 
in real money.” (ibid., 255)
It is remarkable that Yeager refers extensively to Menger´s 
views about the origin of money but mentions neither Ludwig 
von Mises´s monetary writings nor the regression theorem. It is 
an implication of the regression theorem, which Mises built as a 
theoretical insight upon Menger´s historical account, that in the 
spontaneously or “naturally” developed monetary economy the 
definitive money is specie. A specie unit is also the unit of account. 
There is no spontaneous or market-driven path from this system to the non-
commodity or fi at standards that prevail today.13
13 I here assume that the reader is familiar with the regression theorem. 
I nevertheless remind that Ludwig von Mises presented his so-called 
“regression theorem” in 1912 (Mises 1981, 129–46) as an answer to the 
“circularity problem” that thwarted prior attempts to apply marginal 
utility analysis to the value-of-money problem. The circularity problem thus 
arises from the fact that on the one hand we resort to individual value 
scales and demand schedules in order to explain the formation of money 
prices on the market, while on the other hand every time a unit of money 
enters in an individual´s value scale it will do so in virtue of its marginal 
utility, that is its serviceability in exchange rather than in direct use, or 
purchasing power, which itself presupposes or depends upon an already 
given structure of money prices for the various goods. Mises argued that 
although the value of money today (in the sense of purchasing power or 
price on the market) depends upon today´s demand for money (today´s 
marginal utilities of money and of goods expressed in demand schedules), 
today´s demand (marginal utility) in turn depends, not on the value of 
money today, but on its value (purchasing power) yesterday. The value 
of money yesterday serves as a proxy for today´s expected value. As we 
regress backwards in time, we must eventually arrive at the original point 
when people first began to use gold as a medium of exchange. On the fi rst 
day on which people passed from the system of pure barter and began to 
use gold as a medium of exchange, the money price, or rather, the gold 
GARY BECKER ON FREE BANKING — 461
According to the regression theorem, money must arise in the 
manner described by Menger, that is to say it must develop out 
of a commodity already in demand for direct use, the commodity 
then being used as a more and more general medium of exchange. 
Demand for a good as a medium of exchange must be predicated 
on a previously existing array of prices in terms of other goods. 
Admittedly the regression theorem has not been universally 
convincing. In particular Walrasians such as Patinkin had 
suggested that the theorem is really superfluous. The controversy 
obviously also reflects distinct methodological approaches. 
Whereas Mises´s analysis is grounded in temporal cause and effect, 
the Walrasian approach exemplifies the method of simultaneous 
and mutual determination. In historical practice, a nation´s switch 
to fiat money was typically made by the central government first 
granting a legal monopoly of note-issue to a single institution, 
a central bank, whose liabilities became as widely accepted as 
specie, and displaced specie as the reserves for other banks. The 
government then suspended, permanently, the redemption of the 
central bank´s liabilities. With their permanent suspension, central 
bank notes and deposits became a fiat base money. The fiat-money 
unit correspondingly became the unit of account. The now-irre-
deemable notes can continue to circulate because they are familiar, 
and the practice of continuing to accept them is self-reinforcing: it 
is not in any one trader´s self-interest to refuse them if he expects 
others to continue accepting them. 
But so what? One might conjecture that the regression theorem 
does not entail that a fiat money, once in existence, cannot go on 
to exist for extended or even very long periods of time—although 
probably at an ever-depreciating value—even without constant 
further government intervention. In this respect there seems to 
have arisen an extensive as well as a more restrictive interpretation of 
the implications of the regression theorem. According to one inter-
pretation a deeper implication of the regression theorem points 
to an essential incompatibility between the unhampered market 
and fiat money. According to this view one can seriously doubt 
whether conceivably a fiat money could survive for extended 
periods of time on the unhampered market without constant 
further protection by further interventionism. 
price, of every other good depended partially on the marginal utility of 
gold. See also Rothbard [2004] 268–76. According to most authors working 
in the Walrasian monetary tradition there really is no circularity.
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This can be explained as follows. Commodity money enjoys a 
crucial competitive advantage over fiat money: commodity money 
is also used outside of indirect exchange. The fact that commodity 
money always commands a price on the market irrespective of 
how widespread it is used as money, provides a kind of insurance 
for the owners of commodity money: the purchasing power of 
their money never falls to zero because there will always be a non-
monetary demand for it. Even if commodity money falls tempo-
rarily out of use as money, it can always spontaneously re-emerge 
as a medium of exchange, since market participants can rely on its 
present non-monetary market prices to speculate about its future 
purchasing power.
Fiat money to the contrary has by definition no other than 
monetary uses. If the demand for it fades away so that it is even 
momentarily driven out of circulation, it disappears forever; it 
can never be re-introduced again on the market because there are 
no market prices anymore that could serve as a basis for specu-
lations about its future purchasing power. This represents a fatal 
competitive disadvantage of fiat money. There will therefore be a 
strong incentive for all market participants to switch to any kind 
of commodity money rather than remain exposed to the risks of 
fiat money. The only way in which this can be prevented is by the 
creation of an artificial demand for fiat money through government 
intervention, for instance, by requiring taxes to be paid in fiat 
money, or by legal tender laws forcing market participants to 
accept payments in fiat money. (Hülsmann 2000, 429) This line 
of argumentation regarding the essential incompatibility of fiat 
money and the free market economy has a certain plausibility but 
clearly it cannot be put directly to the test, and it can be expected 
to fuel some further controversy.
Furthermore, and contrary to Yeager´s allegation, no genetic 
fallacy is involved. A genetic fallacy is a line of “reasoning” in which 
a perceived defect in the origin of a thing or claim is taken to be 
evidence that discredits the thing or claim itself. The genetic fallacy 
is a general fallacy of irrelevancy involving the origins or history 
of an idea or thing. It is fallacious to either endorse or condemn an 
idea or thing based on its past, rather than on its present merits or 
demerits, unless its past in some way affects its present meaning or 
value. The genetic fallacy is committed whenever an idea or thing 
is evaluated based upon irrelevant history.
However, the theoretician is interested not so much in the 
concrete past history of fractional-reserve free banking in view 
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of evaluating it, but rather in the abstract theoretical question 
concerning the kind of forces which can, in general, be expected 
to sustain this type of institution. It is an interesting theoretical 
question, for instance, whether and to what extent an institution 
like fractional-reserve banking can (or cannot) be conceptualized 
as the outcome of an invisible-hand process. Such exercises need 
involve no genetic fallacy of any sort. From a purely theoretical 
viewpoint it is relevant and interesting to investigate to what 
extent a particular institution tends to be self-sustaining or not, 
and in general, what kind of forces can be expected to sustain it. 
With respect to the institution of fractional-reserve banking in 
particular one might then arrive at the conclusion that any attempt 
at an adequate understanding of its origins, the conditions of its 
existence and subsistence, etc. should adequately take into account 
the roles of lender-of-last-resort institutions, of government deposit 
insurance schemes, of government-imposed legal measures 
curtailing the rights of depositors, etc. The point of interest is thus 
not merely factual and historical but theoretical; it relates to the 
possible origins of various monetary institutions, and to the general 
conditions of their existence and subsistence.14
14 Could it not be objected that the question of whether a particular insti-
tution can possibly emerge as the outcome of a market-driven process or 
not, is irrelevant? This claim is overdrawn. From a theoretical perspective 
the question of which forces sustain a particular institutional phenomenon 
is obviously a relevant and interesting one. One reason for an interest in this 
sort of questions is in view of the (comparative) cost-benefit assessment 
of different institutional forms. If a particular institutional form is not 
self-sustaining, then attempts at nevertheless installing and sustaining it, 
for instance through some deliberate concerted effort by the government 
or a political authority, might come at a high cost (and even then prove 
ultimately impossible to sustain). Even if interaction patterns that are 
only sustainable (and sustained) by political mechanisms, deliberate 
intervention in the market, etc., will often be more costly, this fact will not 
always be clearly perceived to the extent that political mechanisms will 
often tend to conceal some of the implied costs. Often the gains will be 
more visible—since particularized towards specific groups—than some of 
the costs—that may be spread over the population at large, etc. Public 
choice analysis and the rent-seeking literature are of course particularly 
relevant in this context. The groups that benefit from particular inter-
ventions/regulations have an interest in concealing the necessary link 
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Yeager, however, complains that money´s history supports 
misconceptions about its role in the modern world. (ibid., 255) 
It will be noted that the important question is not whether 
commodity money fits “the modern world.” The question is 
rather which kind of money fits a free world. The history of the 
modern world is the history of a succession of unwarranted 
government intrusions and transgressions in monetary matters.
Yeager´s objections against base money are to some degree 
well-founded but they do not carry over to a 100-percent 
commodity standard. Advocates of a 100-percent commodity 
standard do not construct their argument in terms of “base 
money” or in terms of a distinction between “outside money” 
and “inside money.” The only conceptual distinction which 
is made and which is needed in this respect is the distinction 
between money and money titles. (Hoppe 2006) However, a 
money title cannot be identical to the money which it represents 
and thus it is not, in and by itself, money. The phenomena 
Yeager characterizes as “the perils of base money” arise at first 
only when we move towards a fractional-reserve regime.15 
Yeager now points to a further problem: the impracticality 
of 100-percent reserves. It is objected that such a proposal is not 
realizable or cannot be implemented. One has to distinguish 
a claim concerning the alleged impracticality of a commodity 
money from a claim concerning the alleged impracticality of 
100-percent reserves. As regards the former, many examples 
can be cited of fairly long-continued and successful producers 
of private moneys convertible into specie. (Friedman and 
Schwartz 1987, 507) Furthermore, as I have pointed out, the 
regression theorem rather tends to suggest that in a free society 
anything except commodity money would be impracticable. But 
Yeager´s claim concerns more particularly the impracticality 
of a 100-percent reserves requirement. This is an odd objection. 
Why would a 100-percent reserve requirement be more difficult 
to impose and enforce than any of the other fundamental rules of 
between these interventions/regulations and their undesired/undesirable 
side effects and thus in influencing the very perception of both the nature 
of the problems that arise and their possible solutions.
15 Yeager writes with respect to the Selgin-White proposal: “Still, such 
a system would have the disadvantage of a distinct base money and the 
probable disadvantage of a unit defined by gold in particular.” (ibid., 258)
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conduct that are essential to a free society, once it can be assumed 
that the political will to enforce it is not in doubt? Yeager himself 
points out that “[h]istory shows that incentives to evade a 
100-percent-reserve requirement are powerful” (ibid., 256); that is 
surely true but so have been the incentives for governments to go 
to war, to tax their citizens, etc.
It can nevertheless be conceded that from a historical point of 
view, Yeager´s objection is not entirely impertinent. One circum-
stance that may help explain the historically rather constant 
tendency towards the development of fractional-reserve banking 
relates to the problematic character of bearer money certificates 
under a 100- percent reserve commodity standard. Under a 
100-percent reserve commodity standard money certificates 
payable to bearer are clearly problematic. The reason is that it 
becomes impossible for the issuing bank to effectuate a correct 
imputation of the fee due for safekeeping and custody. Market 
participants who receive such money certificates will spend 
them almost immediately while it is not possible for the bank to 
charge them with a fee for the safekeeping of the commodity for 
the period of time during which they held the certificates in their 
cash balances. On the other hand the person who would decide to 
redeem such a certificate will not agree to pay the fee for safekeeping 
corresponding to the entire period during which the certificate has 
been circulating since he may have been holding the certificate in 
his cash balance for only a very limited period of time. Either the 
certificate will circulate at a discount, which may discourage some 
market participants to redeem any such certificates—and this will 
counteract the tendency for certificates to return to the issuing 
bank which in turn will lessen the risk of banking with a fractional 
reserve—or else the bank will find itself in the impossibility to 
charge anyone with a fee for safekeeping. In such circumstances 
deposit banking threatens to become an unprofitable business 
altogether. It comes as no surprise, then, that deposit banks found 
in the practice of fractional-reserve banking a profitable solution 
to this problem created by money certificates payable to bearer. 
Fractional-reserve banking restores profitability and allows the 
banking business to offer an acceptable return again. This is the 
explanation behind the observation that has sometimes been made 
that the genesis of fractional-reserve banking and the widespread 
use of money certificates payable to bearer tend to go together. 
The point made here, however, is mainly of historical relevance 
since the possibilities offered today by electronic banking, such 
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as real-time payment—one thinks of e-gold—eliminate the need 
for circulating certificates and allow the imputation problem to be 
solved.
On the positive side, it can easily be shown that whereas 
the deflationary pressures which Becker correctly identifies are 
indeed endogenous in the context of a fractional-reserve banking 
system, these same tendencies would naturally disappear under 
a commodity standard functioning on a 100-percent reserve 
requirement. Money that is not created out of thin air does not 
disappear as snow before the sun. The considerable elasticity of 
the money stock which is so characteristic of a fractional-reserve 
system is a feature absent from a 100-percent gold standard. 
According to the alternative theory of the business cycle developed 
by the economists of the Austrian School, general countercyclical 
policies, and in particular policies involving monetary and credit 
expansion, will only worsen the evils they are supposed to cure.
We have thus come full circle. Becker´s aim is apparently to 
remove as much as possible any unwarranted government inter-
vention from the monetary and banking system and at the same 
time to contrive a cure for the cyclical movements experienced by 
capitalist societies. A 100-percent reserve requirement in banking 
would on the one hand subject the banking business to the same 
general rules of conduct as those to which all other business 
activities are to be subjected in a free society, and it would at the 
same time render general countercyclical policies superfluous 
since it would at once remove one of the major causes—probably 
the major cause—of cyclical instability in the economy. 
CONCLUSION
As early as 1956, Gary Becker acknowledged the fact that frac-
tional-reserve banking does not constitute “the best of all possible 
(monetary) worlds” since he believed that it should be comple-
mented by general countercyclical policy to combat depressions and 
inflations and to prevent any large scale banking panics .
This viewpoint, as it emanated from an otherwise well known 
“free market” economist, was somewhat remarkable—not to say 
almost anomalous—in at least two respects. First, the occurrence 
of boom-bust cycles, including recessions and depressions, and 
of generally good and bad times, etc. was apparently not concep-
tualized by Becker as the outcome of unwarranted government 
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intervention in the economy. On the contrary these phenomena 
were considered endogenous in an otherwise free society and 
the government has to intervene in order to cure these evils. 
This view contrasts sharply with the view of Austrians who 
have consistently put the blame for the appearance of recurring 
cyclical instability (business cycles) in the economy on institu-
tional factors, and in particular on government-backed monetary 
and credit expansion by a centralized banking system operating 
under fractional reserves. Becker´s fundamental worldview as 
manifested in the 1956 paper was thus one according to which 
“the market fails.” Such a worldview is actually more akin to 
the Keynesian conceptualization than to the view of economists 
commonly designated as “pro-free-market,” whether they belong 
to the so-called Austrian School or to the so-called Chicago 
School, and who would rather conceptualize the unhampered 
market as a “spontaneous order.” 
Second, Becker characterized the 100-percent reserve 
requirement in banking as a specifi c kind of government inter-
vention in the economy instead of recognizing it as the normal 
application to the business of banking of the same legal principles 
which underlie the free society in general. 
In the new introduction to his 1956 paper on free banking 
written especially for the Festschrift in honor of Pascal Salin, 
Becker repudiates or mitigates some of his previous conclusions 
concerning the feasibility of private bank money. This event has 
offered us a fitting occasion to review how considerably our 
thinking about free banking has evolved in the past 50 years and 
also to add a few comments about “the state of the art” concerning 
the characteristics of an acceptable notion of free banking. 
Contrary to his original 1956 opinion Becker now recognizes 
that there are no convincing reasons to consider a government 
monopoly of the currency or note supply an essential ingredient 
of free banking. Fee banking is indeed essentially decentralized 
banking and any such monopoly is incompatible with truly free 
banking. 
Under a decentralized banking regime based on a 100-percent 
reserve requirement and on the possibility for market participants 
to redeem money titles in a commodity money such as gold not 
only would the equilibrium price level be finite but the “perils of 
base money” as manifested by inflations followed by recessions 
and depressions would be practically non-existent.
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Part of the explanation for the “anomalies” in Becker´s original 
1956 paper can probably be provided by referring to “the spirit of 
the age.” The moment at which this paper was written predates the 
demise of Keynesianism and the revival of the Austrian school, as 
well as the rational-expectations approach and the Public Choice 
revolution in economic science. Today we would naturally be less 
inclined to take the potential effectiveness of general countercy-
clical policy for granted as well as more thoughtful concerning the 
true causes of depressions and inflations.
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